Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/mac/TEXT/HUMANrts/PERU.TXU

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TITLE:  PERU HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995




The Government created two separate commissions to review cases
of people unfairly detained for long periods.  An executive
branch commission, formed in February and consisting of several
lawyers, reviews cases of individuals detained on terrorism
charges.  A second commission, established by the Congress in
June and installed in December, will review both terrorism and
criminal cases and recommend presidential "grace" for detainees
who have waited long periods without a trial and who appear to
be innocent.

Inconsistencies in the application of the terrorist amnesty law
were also apparent.  In October, in contravention of the
anonymity clause in the law, President Fujimori publicly named
a university rector and a superior court judge as repentant
terrorists.  The authorities detained the rector, Abner Chavez,
and the judge, Luis Galindo, for 1 month after Fujimori's
statement.  After their release Chavez and Galindo denied
having been Sendero supporters and announced plans to seek
restitution for having been falsely accused.

Although the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it, the
Government did not practice involuntary exile of its citizens.
Several public figures, however, remained in voluntary exile to
escape what they perceived to be political persecution.
Although others claimed they were in exile, they apparently
fled from what appeared to be legitimate criminal charges.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Peruvian system of criminal justice is generally based on
the Napoleonic Code.  A Public Ministry prosecutor investigates
arrests and criminal complaints and then submits an opinion to
a first-instance judge, who decides whether to indict.
Following study of the case, the judge renders a verdict, which
is then reviewed by a superior court prosecutor.  The superior
court prosecutor then submits an opinion on the case to a
superior court judge, who holds a trial.  Terrorism cases, on
the other hand, are tried by anonymous superior court tribunals
made up of three judges.  Virtually all civilian court
convictions are appealed to the Supreme Court.

Defendants have the right to be present at their trial,
although there were instances of trials in absentia of
fugitives (however, a 1993 modification to antiterrorism laws
eliminated convictions in absentia).  Although there were
trials in absentia, they did not lead to convictions, but to
acquittals or judgments in reserve until the defendant was in
custody.  Defendants have the right to counsel, but the
Government often does not provide the indigent with qualified
attorneys.  Following an investigation and filing of charges, a
judge renders a verdict.  Sentences may be appealed to a panel
of judges.

The judicial branch rarely has been fully independent of the
executive.  However, the 1993 Constitution contains a number of
provisions, including an improved system for naming judges,
that provides for a significantly more independent judiciary.
President Fujimori provisionally appointed some two-thirds of
the incumbent judges and prosecutors after he seized
extraconstitutional powers in 1992.  In 1993 the new Congress
appointed an independent tribunal to review the 1992 dismissals
of hundreds of judicial officials, to examine the
qualifications of President Fujimori's appointees, and to
replace those found to be unqualified.  By December this
tribunal completed its review of all the judges and prosecutors
in Lima.  The tribunal found a large number of provisional
judges and prosecutors unqualified and replaced them.  Human
rights groups and independent observers applauded many of the
changes, and reports of corruption decreased with respect to
the reformed jurisdictions.  At year's end, judicial officials
outside Lima had not been reviewed.

The legislative and executive branches openly interfered with
an ongoing judicial branch action when, in February, they
approved a law that imposed a new voting formula on Supreme
Court decisions concerning civil versus military jurisdiction.
This law in effect gave jurisdiction over a sensitive human
rights case (the La Cantuta case--see Section 1.a.) to the
military court system.

There continued to be widespread charges of corruption and of
suborning of judges, prosecutors, police, and witnesses at all
stages of the judicial process, although the number of
complaints in Lima decreased significantly after permanent
judges were named to the Supreme and superior courts.
Government efforts to reduce corruption included a salary raise
for judges and a more active judicial branch control mechanism
to investigate allegations of bribes.  This office of control
dismissed 19 career judges and 33 provisional judges for
misconduct during the year; it fined another 215; and it
admonished 439 for various irregularities.  The Government's
1995 budget allocations include a 70 percent real increase in
funds for the judiciary and a 149 percent real increase for the
Public Ministry, whose responsibilities will dramatically
increase once the long-delayed new Criminal Procedures Code is
brought into force.  The high cost of litigation limited access
to the judicial system, as did the lack of public judicial
services in many isolated areas of the country.

Civilian courts made limited progress in tackling the judicial
backlog, a product of inefficiency, lack of infrastructure and
personnel, archaic case law and criminal procedure law, and the
high number of terrorism cases.  According to the National
Prisons Institute, there were 13,791 detainees awaiting trial
throughout the country on June 30.  Meanwhile, a backlog of 800
to 1,000 cases challenging the constitutionality of laws or
official actions remained pending in the absence of actions to
establish the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees provided
for in the new Constitution.

Sendero and MRTA threats and intimidation of judges were one of
the justifications for President Fujimori's overhaul of the
antiterrorism trial system in 1992.  Civilian courts now try
terrorism cases in anonymous tribunals made up of three
"faceless" judges.  An August 1992 decree law classified many
terrorism cases as treason and therefore triable by military
courts; the lesser cases are heard by civilian tribunals.  In
November Justice Minister Vega announced that he had proposed
an end to the use of faceless judges to try civilians accused
of terrorism, an end to military tribunal jurisdiction over
civilians, and an end to the trial by faceless judges of minors
charged with terrorism.  These proposals were before the
Council of Ministers at year's end.

Between September 1992 and August 1994, according to the
official government newspaper, the military courts remanded 122
cases to civilian jurisdiction after finding that there was not
enough evidence to try some individuals for treason.  Informed
observers believe that antiterrorism police in effect decide
which cases are tried in military courts and which are tried in
civilian courts.  According to various human rights observers,
approximately 80 percent of treason trials in military courts
resulted in convictions; civilian terrorism tribunals, in
contrast, convict only around 60 percent.  Treason convictions
carry sentences from 30 years to life in prison; there were 217
persons serving life sentences for treason at the end of 1994.

Proceedings in military courts do not meet internationally
accepted standards for due process.  Military trials are closed
to the public and carried out in secrecy.  Defense attorneys do
not have access to the evidence, nor can they interview police
or military witnesses (to protect their identities) prior to or
during the trial.  Military judges rarely have any legal
background; they are active duty line officers.  However,
military justice system officials say they are making efforts
to increase the number of judges with legal backgrounds.
Military tribunals in theory must pass judgment within 10
days.  A case may be appealed to the War Council, which has 10
days to make a decision.  A final appeal to the Supreme Council
of Military Justice must be acted on within 5 days.  However,
this calendar is subject to delays in a number of cases.  Human
rights groups charge that military trials have railroaded some
defendants and sentenced them before their lawyers were even
notified that the trial had begun.

Statistics for military prosecutions of civilians suggested
greater care and selectivity in the application of treason laws
to the most serious cases.  In 1994 military courts prosecuted
civilians in 356 treason cases compared to 315 in 1993, but
imposed life sentences on 72 persons, compared to 117 in 1993.
Although the proceedings in military courts for all practical
purposes are summary, not all those prosecuted are convicted.
The military courts acquitted defendants in 7 cases and
remanded 53 cases to civil authorities.  The Government has
publicly recognized that military trials of civilians are a
temporary, extraordinary measure out of step with international
norms, to be reformed as soon as the situation in its judgment
permits.  The authorities also began a review process of
military trials.  In late 1993, this review process absolved
Miguel Ruiz-Conejo, who had been wrongly convicted of treason
in a military court, and ordered his release.  In 1994 a
special military tribunal annulled five life sentences after
discovering procedural and other errors in reviewing those
trials.

In late April, the Government postponed indefinitely
implementation of a new Criminal Procedures Code that was to
have taken effect on May 1.  The new Code would have instituted
accusatorial investigative and trial procedures.  Instead, the
Government established an interagency commission to "reconcile"
the Code with the 1993 Constitution and present the Congress
with a plan for the gradual application of the revised Code.
Informed observers claimed that the Government postponed the
Code's implementation because the National Police were unhappy
with provisions that would grant more investigative authority
to prosecutors; because the armed forces opposed a provision
that would mean prosecution of military personnel in civilian
court for crimes such as murder that do not come under the
Military Code of Justice; and because the Public Ministry was
not prepared in terms of budget or personnel to put the new
Code into practice.

In 1993 an international panel of distinguished jurists visited
Peru and studied the legal and judicial system to determine
whether or not there was adequate due process, particularly in
terrorism trials.  The panel recommended eliminating military
trials of civilians and reintroducing precepts of due process
suspended by the 1992 antiterrorism decrees.  When the jurists
made their report public in April, President Fujimori and his
Justice Minister rejected it as interference in Peru's internal
affairs.  The Government maintained that further changes in the
law and procedures used in treason and terrorism cases must be
linked to progress in pacification, as well as to reform of the
judicial branch.  The jurists' report stimulated a serious
public debate.

The new Constitution provides for several new judicial
institutions to help create a more effective and independent
system of justice:  an Office of the Defender of the People (a
human rights ombudsman); a Tribunal of Constitutional
Guarantees (which would rule on the constitutionality of
legislation and government actions); the National Judiciary
Council (a permanent, independent entity in charge of testing,
naming, confirming, and periodically evaluating and
disciplining the country's judges and prosecutors); and a
Judicial Academy (to train judges and prosecutors).  The
Congress passed legislation to define the structure and
functions of only the last two institutions; it had not
established the other entities by the end of the year, but did
create the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees in January
1995.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

The Constitution requires security forces to have a judicial
warrant to enter a private dwelling, but this requirement is
suspended in the emergency zones, and security forces in those
areas routinely conduct searches of private homes without
warrants.  The law requires that a Public Ministry prosecutor
be present during searches.  There were plausible reports that,
on occasion, police planted subversive pamphlets in the homes
of persons they suspected of terrorism but could not otherwise
arrest for lack of evidence.  There were frequent credible
reports of illegal telephone wiretaps.  In August and
September, several prominent journalists, opposition
politicians, and retired military officers made credible claims
that the Government's intelligence services followed them,
videotaped them, and recorded their private conversations.

In Lima and other urban areas, the army conducted "sweep"
operations in which soldiers surrounded and sealed off targeted
neighborhoods to conduct house-to-house searches.  They
detained persons wanted for a crime and held for questioning
those found with unregistered weapons, subversive material, or
without identity documents.  Public prosecutors routinely
accompany these operations, and citizens made few complaints of
serious abuses stemming from them.

A number of rural communities--with arms, training, and
encouragement from the army--have organized self-defense
forces, or rondas, to protect themselves against terrorist and
bandit incursions.  These have had a noticeable impact on
curbing Sendero's presence in certain areas of the country.  In
some parts of Peru, rondas have existed for centuries as a form
of social organization and to protect communities from invaders
and rustlers.  However, military authorities organized many of
the newer rondas and sometimes coerced peasants into
participating.  As a regular practice and to a far greater
degree, Sendero also forced peasants to join its military
ranks, often for extended periods, coercing their participation
in terrorist attacks and executions.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
         Law in Internal Conflicts

Although the Government stated that its security forces did not
have a policy of indiscriminate violence against civilians,
army troops nevertheless killed an undetermined number of
noncombatants in the Upper Huallaga valley.  Between March 29
and March 31, according to witnesses who testified before the
local prosecutor, an army patrol detained and then killed
between 8 and 12 villagers in Cayumba Chico, south of the city
of Tingo Maria in Huanuco department.  The army also began to
deny access to the zone north of Tingo Maria and west of the
Huallaga river to delegates of the ICRC.  In the course of a
claimed major sweep between April 5 and April 8, members of the
army, using both helicopters and ground troops, entered the
settlements of Molluna and Moena and, according to similar,
credible accounts by numerous eyewitnesses, indiscriminately
killed most of the population.  In some cases rape and torture
preceded the killing.  The army reportedly fired rockets from
helicopters at the settlements.

The exact number of dead was difficult to determine because the
army closed the zone to nonmilitary personnel for 7 weeks,
during which time remains could have been moved or buried, and
because many of the residents were transient farm workers whose
only relatives were unlikely to report them as missing.  The
Coordinadora decided to list only 25 persons as victims of the
army operation--the only ones who could be identified by name,
based on eyewitness reports and identified remains.  The armed
forces, the Congress, and the Attorney General's office
undertook investigations into these killings.  In November a
special prosecutor responsible for investigating this incident
brought charges in a civilian court against an army captain for
ordering the deaths of at least eight persons.  The army
subsequently undertook other large-scale operations in other
regions of the country without new claims of abuses, possibly
indicating that commanders made a conscious effort to avoid
what happened in April.

Although both the army and Sendero Luminoso violated
humanitarian law in Peru's internal conflict, the latter was
responsible for many more heinous violations than the former.
Sendero frequently used arbitrary violence against civilians
and nonmilitary targets.  It continued to detonate powerful
bombs in public places, indiscriminately killing and injuring
dozens of bystanders, and persisted in its practice of entering
villages and killing residents.  Many of the victims were
unarmed women and children.  Terrorist bomb attacks perpetrated
by Sendero and MRTA killed 14 people and injured 86.

In April, in one of its more gruesome massacres, a Sendero
Luminoso column entered the village of Monterrico in the
Mazamari district of Junin department, burned down houses, and
tortured and beheaded 18 residents.  In the same area in August
residents discovered graves of several Ashaninka Indians
believed to have been killed by Sendero (see also Section 5).

In armed confrontations, Sendero never took prisoners or
attended to the wounded; its normal aim was to kill as many
people as possible.  Sendero also practiced forced military
conscription of both adults and children.  The law prohibits
military conscription of children, and government forces
respected this prohibition.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and freedom of
the press.  While the Government generally respected this
provision, there were many instances when government officials
or members of the security forces harassed media
representatives.  The Government also used its economic power
and the legal system to exert influence over the media.

The media represent a wide spectrum of information and opinion,
with 8 television stations, 3 cable systems, 72 radio stations,
and 16 daily newspapers in Lima alone.  The media regularly
criticize the Government and its policies.  The Government owns
a television network, a daily newspaper, and a radio station,
none of which is particularly influential.

Opposition political parties and factions have access to the
media.  Television stations, although generally progovernment,
provide regular access to opposition figures on a variety of
news and public affairs programs.  The written press is defined
by extremes, with many leading newspapers and magazines either
strongly for or against the Government.

The Government took steps to eliminate the applicability to the
media of the Constitution's "habeas data" provision.  This
legal mechanism gives citizens the right to demand
rectification for articles or reports they consider slanderous.
Many journalists viewed this provision as a potential tool to
censor and harass the press.  As a result of these concerns,
the government majority in Congress voted 56 to 1 on August 18
to remove from the Constitution the portion of the "habeas
data" clause related to the press.  Local journalists praised
this action, as did the Inter-American Press Society which
called the vote "an important step towards full observance of
press freedom."  However, the measure will not become law until
the Congress approves it a second time in a subsequent
legislative session and the President signs it.

On several isolated occasions, government officials took
measures that interfered with press freedom.  On April 15,
President Fujimori personally ordered a Reuter television crew
to erase video footage it had taken during his visit to a
maximum security prison in Puno, which showed Sendero Luminoso
prisoners reading a statement about their support for a then
secret peace letter.  The foreign correspondents' association
protested the action but received no response from the
Government.

Also in April, the military justice system indicted six retired
generals on charges of "insulting the armed forces."  The
retired officers had, in various press interviews, criticized
decisions by the army leadership.  Despite their retired
status, they were subjected to court-martial.  In addition, a
military court summoned a journalist for the opposition daily
La Republica in April to explain his February 13 interview with
one of the indicted generals who had criticized the army's
handling of the La Cantuta case.

On April 30, army personnel arrested and beat radio journalist
Cesar Flores in Huanta, Ayacucho department.  The day before,
Flores had denounced the army's mistreatment of another
journalist.  The army held Flores at the local army base for 6
days on trumped-up charges that he had not done his obligatory
military duty.

In March a Lima radio journalist began receiving anonymous
telephone calls threatening him with death if he did not stop
criticizing the Government.  When the journalist complained to
police, they sent him official notices to appear for
interrogation regarding alleged terrorist actions that had
occurred in far-off provinces.  The harassment stopped after
international human rights monitors expressed interest in the
case.

On September 2, the commander of the first military region,
army Lieutenant General Howard Rodriguez, ordered his staff to
expose the film of a La Republica photographer who had shot
footage showing the General handing out calendars and posters
of President Fujimori.  General Rodriguez also allegedly
threatened the reporter.  Although observers agreed that the
General's original activities constituted a probable violation
of the constitutionally mandated political neutrality of the
armed forces, the authorities took no action against him.

The authorities continued to detain 15 journalists for trial on
terrorism charges at the end of 1994; the courts acquitted
13 others of terrorism charges during the year.  However, their
detentions did not appear to be the result of a government
policy to persecute journalists.

The Government also exercises substantial influence over the
media through the placement of advertisements.  Some media
owners claim that the Government also encourages private
advertisers to boycott opposition publications and uses tax
investigations to harass the opposition media.  Many media
owners are involved in other economic activities that require
government licensing or involve bidding on government
contracts.  All these factors result in a degree of self-
censorship, particularly in the broadcast media.

The Government often restricted opposition media access by
refusing to send news releases and other information to some
magazines and limiting access to official transportation when
the President visited remote parts of the country or traveled
to other nations.  However, after widespread criticism of the
secrecy that characterized the army's April sweep operation in
Huanuco department, the military authorities began to report
publicly on a more regular basis the results of their
operations.

The Government also used the legal system to keep opposition
journalists off balance.  Enrique Zileri, publisher of the
opposition weekly magazine Caretas, was subject to a judicial
order to seize his possessions in July.  The judge who signed
the order immediately took a vacation, leaving a substitute
judge to carry out the action.  The attempted seizure resulted
from accusations by a convicted felon who objected to his name
being used in a Caretas story on drug trafficking.  The case
had supposedly ended some time earlier, when the superior court
had ruled in Zileri's favor, yet somehow a second case for the
same alleged offense was initiated.  Last-minute action by
Zileri and his attorney prevented the police contingent that
appeared on his doorstep from enforcing the seizure.  An
editorial in the July 27 edition of the conservative daily
newspaper El Comercio said the case had "awakened suspicions"
about the "series of intimidating actions taken against"
members of the political opposition.

As with other sectors of society, the media were not immune to
Sendero Luminoso attacks.  The most notorious example of
Sendero violence against the media occurred on March 14, when
the house of Patricio Ricketts, a columnist with the daily
newspaper Expreso, was bombed.  The attack, which killed a
passerby and wounded Ricketts' daughter, appeared to be in
retaliation for a Ricketts column titled "Sendero is
annihilated," which had appeared in Expreso the previous day.
Officials at Channel 2, the most progovernment television
station (and the site of a 1992 Sendero car-bombing), also
reported receiving regular Sendero threats.  Even opposition-
leaning Channel 9 arranged for a group of soldiers to occupy a
floor of its central office building as a form of insurance
against Sendero attacks.

The Government generally respected academic freedom as long as
it did not involve direct confrontation with security
practices.  The Government usually does not interfere in the
teaching, discussion, or publication of a variety of opinions;
however, all forms of indoctrination by subversive groups are
prohibited, and teachers who express support of terrorist
ideology are subject to prosecution.

Sendero and, to a lesser extent, MRTA, have for a long time
used threats and abuse against faculty, staff, and students in
an effort to gain control of a number of universities.
However, since the military took control of campus security at
several universities in 1991 and 1992, the terrorist groups
have maintained a lower profile.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution expressly provides for these rights, and the
authorities normally respect them in practice, except in areas
under a state of emergency (where the right of assembly is
suspended).  Public meetings in plazas or streets require
advance permission, which may be denied only for reasons of
public safety or health.  Municipal authorities usually
approved permits for demonstrations in Lima and nonemergency
zones.  Unauthorized public meetings occurred, and the police
occasionally used clubs, tear gas, and water cannons to break
up marches or disperse large crowds, sometimes using excessive
force.  The police interrupted both unruly and peaceful
gatherings this way in Lima, using these tactics against
striking public service workers, small political rallies, and a
march by students protesting human rights violations.  In
October police fired on a union march by dock workers in the
port city of Callao, wounding two protesters.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government respects this provision in practice.  The
Constitution recognizes Roman Catholicism "as an important
element in the historical, cultural, and moral development of
the nation," but also establishes the separation of church and
State.  Conversion to other religions is respected, and
missionaries are allowed to enter the country and proselytize.

Sendero Luminoso rejects religion and continued to threaten and
intimidate religious workers.  In addition to threats, Sendero
terrorists threw a stick of dynamite at a Mormon chapel in
Chilca in June.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for the right of free movement, and
there are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel
or emigration.  However, the authorities can restrict people
with pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges from
leaving the country.  Freedom of movement is suspended in the
emergency zones but is generally permitted under control of the
army.  Nonetheless, the authorities may detain travelers in the
emergency zones at any time.  During the army's operation in
northern Huanuco department in April, the army closed a zone
north of Tingo Maria and west of the Huallaga river for several
weeks (see Section 1.g.).

The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship.
Repatriates (both voluntary and involuntary) are not treated
any differently than other citizens.  Peru has provisions for
granting asylum and refugee status; the procedures have been
used by small groups of persons in recent years, principally
Cubans.  Refugees are not forced to return to countries in
which they fear persecution.